Labor Migration, Trafficking and Border Controls by Ford, Michele & Lenore, Lyons
The final, definitive version of this paper has been published as: 
Ford, M., Lyons, L. (2012). Labor Migration, Trafficking and Border Controls. In Thomas M. 
Wilson, Hastings Donnan (Eds.), A Companion to Border Studies, (pp. 438-454). Chichester: 
Wiley-Blackwell Publishing. 
Reproduced with permission of Wiley-Blackwell Publishing © 2012 Blackwell Publishing 
Ltd. Published 2012 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd. The definitive, published, version of 
record is available here: http://www.wiley.com/WileyCDA/WileyTitle/productCd-
1405198931.html 
 
Labor Migration, Trafficking and Border Controls 
Michele Ford and Lenore Lyons 
In the last decade there has been unprecedented international interest in addressing the crime 
of human trafficking. Often described as the third largest form of transnational criminal 
activity (cf. Jayagupta 2009), human trafficking is typically understood to involve the forcible 
movement of women and children across borders for the purposes of exploitative labor, 
usually in the commercial sex industry. This understanding is enshrined in the 2000 United 
Nations Trafficking Protocol which contains three key elements that in combination are said 
to determine whether a case of human trafficking has occurred. These are: (1) an action (e.g., 
recruitment); (2) a means (e.g., coercion or deception); and (3) a purpose (exploitation).1 
According to this definition, consent is irrelevant once it is established that deception, force 
or other prohibited means have been used in recruiting a "victim" of trafficking. 
The issue of consent is important in distinguishing human trafficking from migrant 
smuggling, since smuggling is deemed not to involve exploitation of the individual at the 
point of destination: "Whereas the illegal crossing of borders is the aim of smuggling, the aim 
of trafficking is the exploitation of one's labour. In other words, the issue of smuggling 
concerns the protection of the state against illegal migrants, while the issue of trafficking 
concerns the protection of individual persons against violence and abuse" (Ditmore and 
Wijers 2003: 80). Although it is acknowledged that human trafficking may occur via both 
legal and illegal migration streams, people smuggling is defined as the illegal movement of 
people across national borders.2 The crucial distinction between the two phenomena, 
therefore, is the forced labor or slavery-like conditions that always characterize trafficking, 
which is inherently exploitative and not incidentally exploitative as is the case with 
smuggling (Kempadoo 2005: xii). 
International policy responses to both human trafficking and people smuggling are invariably 
framed in border security terms - states act to stop illegal cross-border flows, rescue 
"victims," detain "illegals," and prosecute evil "traffickers" and "smugglers." This criminal 
justice/border security framework is supported at an international level by the placement of 
both the Trafficking Protocol and the Migrant Smuggling Protocol within the UN Convention 
against Transnational Organized Crime, which aims to address other types of illegal cross-
border flows such as the sale of armaments and drugs. The legal distinction between 
trafficking and smuggling embodied in the creation of two separate protocols reflects 
international concern to protect the human rights of vulnerable people (primarily women and 
children) who fall prey to criminal gangs and syndicates who seek to exploit them, while at 
the same time supporting the state's right to protect its borders from "illegals" and "queue 
jumpers." 
While the Convention seeks to distinguish between trafficking, smuggling, and other forms of 
migration, in reality the boundaries are very much blurred. Individuals who have been 
smuggled may find themselves working in the same industries as persons who have been 
trafficked and may be subject to the same exploitative practices (Grewcock 2003; Skeldon 
2000). Conversely, victims of trafficking may be treated as undocumented migrants if they 
are caught outside an obvious trafficking context. The artificial distinctions between 
trafficking and smuggling also overlook the temporal dimension to migration cycles. Migrant 
workers who cross borders for illegal work may change jobs and face exploitation (thus 
moving from a situation of smuggling to trafficking) many months or years after they first 
crossed the border; and children and teenagers, who were by definition "trafficked," become 
adult migrants. Moreover, these problems are not only faced by "illegal" migrants. As Wong 
notes in her study of labor migrants in Malaysia, "individual migrant lives constantly weave 
their way in and out of intersecting spheres of legality and illegality" (2005: 71), and thus, 
while labor migration, trafficking and smuggling are legally different, the consequences in 
terms of migrants' vulnerability to exploitation are often similar. 
Even though scholars and policy-makers acknowledge the fluid boundaries between human 
trafficking, people smuggling and "legal" labor migration, these artificial distinctions remain 
a cornerstone of immigration laws. In a post-9/11 world, border control has become a matter 
of symbolic performance for many governments, who rely on the myth of its loss to justify 
increasingly restrictive economic and social policies (Anderson and O'Dowd 1999; Pickering 
2004; van Schendel and Abraham 2005). In fact, the most common policy response to the 
massive movement of people that has characterized globalization is the establishment of legal 
frameworks aimed at restricting immigration and prosecuting illegal entries (Segrave and 
Milivojevic 2005). This involves increasingly punitive immigration and border control 
regimes and the implementation of antitrafficking laws that aim to punish traffickers and 
smugglers, repatriate trafficking victims and deport "illegals." In many instances, the specter 
of human trafficking has been effectively mobilized to legitimize the increasing 
criminalization of migrants and those who assist them (Sharma 2005: 92). At a policy level 
these ambiguities serve an important purpose, enabling compromises to be made between 
actors with different interests and concerns. 
The blurred boundaries between human trafficking and migrant smuggling are a structural 
by-product of the need to accommodate different state responses to migration control and 
border security. The advantage of this fuzziness is that it "enables a high degree of rhetoric 
flexibility, which ensures an adhesion that would not be the same if policies only aimed to 
reduce undocumented migration" (Nieuwenhuys and Pecoud 2007: 1690). All forms of 
migration become confined to a narrow and restrictive security framework as a consequence 
of fusing migration and crime in this way. This is no more apparent than in the ways in which 
some states respond to the issues associated with temporary labor migration. While the 
capacity for individual states to regulate labor migration varies considerably, there is a 
remarkable consistency in the ways in which state authorities seek to manage temporary labor 
flows. Both sending and receiving countries have developed complex immigration and 
employment regimes to recruit and deploy labor migrants and most of these regimes assume a 
clear distinction between legal and illegal arrival and deployment. Nonetheless, most states 
exercise restraint and selectivity in addressing irregular labor migration, and their repertoire 
of responses varies according to socioeconomic and political realities (Al1mad 2008). In 
some cases it may suit the interests of both states and employers to have access to a large 
irregular workforce (Cunningham and Heyman 2004; Ford 2006a). In others, strict regulation 
of all migration flows is intimately tied to public debates about "law and order" and "border 
security" (Crinis 2005; Grewcock 2007). 
Since the signing of the UN Trafficking Protocol in 2000 another dimension has been added 
to bordering practices as they pertain to the regulation of international labor migration. In the 
face of mounting evidence that documented labor migrants encounter a range of exploitative 
practices in destination countries, a number of international development agencies, 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and some states have started to employ an 
"antitrafficking framework" in their thinking and practice when dealing with cases of labor 
exploitation faced by "legal" migrants. The problems that many of these workers face include 
confinement and restricted freedom of movement; falsified and fake documents; bonded 
labor and debt bondage; deception; violence and abuse; poor working conditions; and 
nonpayment of wages. Rather than dealing with these issues as cases of labor abuse using the 
labor laws of receiving countries, migrant rights activists and some states have turned to 
antitrafficking laws. They argue that the endemic nature of these problems, and the ease with 
which documented migrant workers can become undocumented, means that the vast majority 
of low-skilled migrant workers can quite easily be characterized as "victims of human 
trafficking" using the definition contained within the UN Trafficking Protocol (cf. ASI 2003; 
IOM 2007). 
By describing "documented/legal" migrants as "victims of trafficking," this approach disrupts 
the categories typically used by governments to regulate temporary labor migration. This 
perspective has been facilitated by the massive investment in antitrafficking initatives by 
international agencies and donors since 2000. Donor aid provides the resources to pursue 
labor abuse cases as "trafficking cases," and international pressure to ratify the Trafficking 
Protocol and to demonstrate compliance with minimum standards outlined in the annual 
Trafficking in Persons Report prepared by the US State Department provides political 
motivation (Chuang 2006; McSherry and Cullen 2007). Countries that do not comply are 
subject to sanctions, including the termination of nonhumanitarian aid and non trade-related 
assistance and US opposition to assistance from international financial institutions (Ould 
2004: 61). In addition, trafficking and smuggling, as core subjects of the UN Convention 
against Transnational Crime, are linked with measures to address "global terrorism" in the 
heightened security environment post-9/11 and governments are encouraged to take a tough 
stance on irregular migration through tighter border controls (Kaur and Metcalfe 2006). In 
this environment, dealing with documented labor migrants under antitrafficking laws or 
programs can provide states with the means to demonstrate that they are "tough" on 
trafficking, smuggling and terrorism. 
This approach should not, however, be regarded as simply a means to deal with international 
pressure from the United States and other donor countries. It also reflects a growing view 
among some scholars and activists that the legal distinction between labor migration, human 
trafficking and migrant smuggling should be jettisoned on the grounds that it leads to 
unnecessary confusion and focuses attention on the means rather than the conditions of 
recruitment and deployment (cf. Brock et al. 2000; Grewcock 2003; O'Connell Davidson and 
Anderson 2006): "if the primary concern is to locate, explain and combat the use of forced 
labor, slavery, servitude and the like, then there is no moral or analytical reason to distinguish 
between forced labor involving 'illegal immigrants,' 'smuggled persons' or 'victims of 
trafficking'" (Anderson and O'Connell Davidson 2003: 7). These concerns have led some 
advocates and scholars to argue that the focus should be on addressing human rights 
violations of all labor migrants, regardless of how they cross borders (Brock et al. 2000). 
Once the focus of attention moves away from the means by which a migrant arrives in a 
destination country and shifts instead to conditions of work, strategies can be developed to 
address labor exploitation and promote the social and labor rights of all migrants. This 
approach is exemplified in the use of forced labor conventions and protocols by the 
International Labour Organization (ILO) to pursue the rights of migrant workers. The ILO 
defines forced labor as "all work or service which is exacted from any person under the 
menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily" 
(ILO 2009: 5). In their ILO-funded research, Andrees and van der Linden (2005) describe a 
"forced labour continuum" in which they identify three categories of labor – trafficked 
victims of forced labor, nontrafficked victims of forced labor and successful migrants. They 
argue that trafficked victims of forced labor are subject to the worst abuses because they 
generally have the least freedom of movement and are the most vulnerable, while 
nontrafficked victims of forced labor face a range of exploitative conditions, including 
nonpayment of wages, retention of identity documents, long working hours and unacceptable 
working conditions. For Andrees and van der Linden (2005: 63), the advantage of the "forced 
labour continuum" over the traditional distinction between "legal labour migrants," "victims 
of trafficking," and "illegal migrants" is that it provides a means to examine the “varying 
degrees to which migrants can become victims of exploitation, routes that lead into forced 
labour and individual strategies to escape from coercion and control.”3 
An alternative approach within the NGO community is to argue that all migrants who face 
cases of labor exploitation are victims of trafficking. For example, Anti-Slavery International 
(ASI) includes documented migrant domestic workers as victims of trafficking, arguing that a 
"sophisticated system of debt-bondage and forced labour" characterizes the domestic work 
industry (Ould 2004: 62). Similarly, Human Rights Watch (2008: 40) concludes that 
trafficking is widespread among migrant domestic workers. According to Jureidini and 
Moukarbel, the majority of migrant domestic workers enter into employment contracts which 
are deliberately misleading, and "such direct and indirect deception regarding contractual 
security... places workers within the category of having been trafficked" (2004: 585). To 
combat the "trafficking" of migrant domestic workers, ASI recommends a three-pronged 
approach that includes regulation of the domestic work sector, labor organizing, and the 
application of the Trafficking Protocol (ASI 2003: 40). 
These debates have very real consequences not only for irregular labor migrants, but also for 
borderlands and borderlanders, especially at highly visible international boundaries with a 
history of undocumented border-crossing. The increasing securitization of borders can make 
the process of border crossing more onerous and expensive for all individuals who seek to 
cross the border. As a result, borderlanders involved in routinized border crossings are 
subject to increasing state interest. They may be harassed, subject to a range of "fines," and 
even arrested as traffickers or people smugglers (Eilenberg in press). Border policing 
activities also disrupt the livelihoods of smugglers, petty traders, and labor brokers, especially 
when government officials make them the target of antitrafficking campaigns and initiatives. 
In contexts where borderlanders lay claim to the unique and special character of their cross-
border activities as being "illegal but licit" (Abraham and van Schendel 2005), 
countertrafficking efforts can threaten to disrupt what many see as a traditional way of life 
(Ford and Lyons in press-b). Understanding the impact of the antitrafficking movement on all 
forms of labor migration therefore necessitates attention to the discursive and material 
practices of bordering that take place not only in the center and "en route," but also in the 
borderlands themselves. 
Labor migration, people smuggling and human trafficking in the Riau Islands 
The policy implications of dealing with labor migration via an antitrafficking lens are clearly 
demonstrated in the case of the Riau Islands, which form part of Indonesia's border with 
Singapore and Malaysia.4 The complex intersections between migration flows and different 
regulatory regimes in the border zone reveal the slippages between labor migration, 
smuggling and trafficking in practice and in policy. The islands of Bintan, Batam and 
Karimun, which lie in the Straits of Malacca to the northeast of Sumatra and directly south of 
Singapore (see Figure 1), are part of the Riau Islands Province (Provinsi Kepulauan Riau, 
Kepri). Since the mid-1980s, significant numbers of Indonesians have passed through these 
islands in search of work abroad in Singapore or Malaysia. The islands are also an arrival 
point for returning international migrants, including undocumented workers deported to 
Indonesia by the governments of those countries. In addition, they have been identified as a 
trafficking "hotspot," primarily of women and girls from other parts of Indonesia into the 
locally based commercial sex industry but also into the international sex trade. 
The mass movement of Indonesians into the islands and across the border was precipitated by 
a range of factors, including in particular the establishment of a cross-border growth triangle 
(the Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore Growth Triangle, IMS-GT) in the 1990s and a free-trade 
zone with Singapore in the 2000s. The IMS-GT attracted international investment in 
manufacturing and tourism which depended on the recruitment of low-skilled workers from 
throughout Indonesia, who initially migrated to the sparsely populated island of Batam on 
short-term contracts. Over time, the region drew large numbers of spontaneous migrants who 
traveled to the border in search of well-paying jobs in the islands' industrial zones. Initially, 
employment prospects were good but, as migrant numbers grew, particularly after the Asian 
financial crisis hit Indonesia, good jobs became increasingly scarce. Some chose to remain in 
the islands. However, others decided to cross the border in search of work, joined by the 
many migrants who had traveled to the province with the explicit intention of finding work 
abroad. 
 
Figure 1: The Riau Islands 
An examination of the experiences of these cross-border migrants reveals the ease with which 
individuals can slip between the categories of trafficking victim, undocumented or irregular 
migrant, and documented or regular labor migrant. A migrant worker's legal status is 
determined by source- and host-country government regulations and practices concerning 
migration rather than any inherent characteristics of the individual temporary migrant worker, 
or even necessarily the kind of work they seek to undertake. The migration regimes of host 
and source countries intersect in complex ways, with the consequence that a migrant worker's 
status cannot simply be determined by whether or not they have entered a host country using 
a legally recognized work permit or visa. The processes that potential migrant workers follow 
prior to leaving the source country, as well as the practices that they encounter on arrival in 
the host country can have just as much bearing on their legal status. Ultimately, the 
determination as to whether a worker is deemed to be a documented "regular" labor migrant 
depends on which jurisdiction is invoked, by which authority, and at what time in the 
migration cycle. 
While public attention is often focused on what receiving countries do to regulate 
immigration flows, governments in source countries like Indonesia also play a key role in 
creating the "regular" channels through which low- and semiskilled labor migrants must pass. 
These processes have evolved over time as a result of public pressure to protect the labor and 
human rights of nationals working abroad. The Indonesian government's management of 
temporary labor migration is enshrined in its law on the Placement and Protection of 
Indonesian Workers Overseas, a law ostensibly designed to improve the placement and 
protection of Indonesian migrant workers. In order to be considered "legal" under this 
framework, intending labor migrants must first register with their local labor office. Workers 
are recruited from this pool by officially sanctioned recruitment agents who organize their 
health checks, training, insurance, labor migrant passports (paspor TKI) and employment 
visas. Intending migrant workers are required to remain in holding centers for between one 
and three months while they await placement overseas. The complexities of the official 
process create ample opportunities for rent-seeking within the formal system and at each 
stage of the recruitment process, prospective labor migrants are faced with yet another round 
of paperwork and fees (Palmer in press). The time and costs involved provide many migrants 
with sufficient motivation to seek out an alternative migration channel (Ford 2001; Idrus 
2008). 
Many labor migrants passing through the Riau Islands choose to take the more cost-effective 
and efficient "documented but illegal" route.5 These migrants carry what are described in 
Indonesian as aspal papers (asli tapi palsu, real but fake), reflecting the fact that they are 
genuine documents obtained without going through all the processes that define formally 
sanctioned channels of temporary labor migration (Ford and Lyons 2011). Migrant workers 
using the aspal route are typically delivered to the islands by middlemen or employees of 
agents based in Kepri. The island-based agent obtains a local identity card (known locally as 
KTP musiman or a "seasonal identity card") for the prospective worker using contacts in the 
local bureaucracy. The identity card is then leveraged to obtain a migrant worker passport. 
Alternatively, intending aspal migrants are issued with a standard passport which, although it 
does not conform to the specifications of the labor export program, is an official travel 
document that may be recognized by overseas governments issuing work visas. This means 
that a prospective labor migrant can use the passport to exit Indonesia and legally enter a 
neighboring country, where they are issued with a valid work permit. 
The aspal system produces a category of migrant workers who, while "documented" from the 
perspective of the receiving country, are considered by the Indonesian government to be 
"illegal" because they have not followed official labor deployment processes for overseas 
workers. Although both the identity card and the passport are obtained via unofficial means 
and may falsify information about their bearer (including name, place of birth and residence), 
they are to all intents and purposes legally valid documents issued by the authorities 
responsible. For prospective migrant workers who have yet to cross the border, the 
possession of aspal papers does not constitute a significant source of concern - it is not 
unusual for Indonesians to possess multiple identity cards, often with different names or 
details. Furthermore, the possession of such documents rarely poses a barrier to obtaining an 
overseas placement or, ultimately, to leaving the country. In addition, local authorities are 
often reluctant to report individuals or officials involved in the production of such documents. 
Immigration officials who uncover fraudulent documents when they process passport 
applications are also reluctant to report this information because it would implicate their 
colleagues in corrupt practices (Government of Indonesia 2009). In countries of destination, 
labor attachés and other embassy officials exercise a degree of discretion when they 
encounter those who have not followed official Indonesian labor migration regulations 
abroad, with the consequence that there are few sanctions from the Indonesian government 
against workers who contravene its laws (Palmer in press). 
Many Indonesians enter Singapore and Malaysia as "tourists" on visitor passes and then 
either convert their visas to work permits with the assistance of a local labor placement agent 
or work in contravention of the conditions of their tourist pass. The vast majority of those 
going to Malaysia on this basis travel the aspal route from elsewhere in the Indonesian 
archipelago. However, a significant number of temporary migrant workers - particularly of 
those seeking to work in Singapore - are Riau Islanders with kinship networks that stretch 
across the international border, or long-term residents who have forged business relationships 
with customers and clients on either side of the border. This subgroup, which generally 
travels independently of the aspal system, tends to be engaged in informal sector occupations 
that are not officially open to labor migrants such as petty trading, small-scale service 
provision (such as tailoring) or the commercial sex industry. The majority of short-term labor 
migrants cross the border with the intention of staying until their visas expire and/ or the 
work runs out. They then take a ferry back to the Riau Islands and, after a suitable length of 
time, cross the border again. 
Another smaller group of migrants leave Indonesia without documents of any kind. These 
migrants use the services of smugglers who operate covertly, usually under cover of 
darkness, to drop their human cargo offshore along more remote sections of the Malaysian 
coastline. Attempts at landing in Singapore are much less successful because the coastline is 
more heavily populated and the strait more frequently patrolled. If they are successful in their 
attempt to enter illegally, these workers find work in construction sites, plantations or the 
informal sector. It is this group of migrant workers who most accurately meet the definition 
of people smuggling and thus fall into the category of "undocumented" or "irregular" labor 
migrants.6 
The channel a worker uses to get to a host country is only one possible determinant in the 
construction of his or her legal status - the ultimate determination rests witll the receivmg 
country. Singapore and Malaysia have complex mechanisms through which unskilled and 
semiskilled labor migration is managed. In both cases, a migrant worker's status is 
determined by (1) the issuing of a legally valid temporary work permit, and (2) the worker's 
compliance with the regulations that govern that permit. A host country may accommodate a 
source country's labor export regulations though a non-binding Memorandum 
ofUnderstandmg (MOU). However, such agreements are of limited effect. Although 
Malaysia is formally commItted not to accept labor migrants who have not come through the 
Indonesian export labor system, anecdotal evidence suggests that It continues to accord legal 
status to some workers who have not emigrated in this way - provisions that have at times 
been of great benefit to aspal mIgrants. MalaYSIan officials also turn a blind eye to irregular 
migrants when it is politically or economically favorable to do so (Ford 2010). Singapore, 
which does not have a MOU with Indonesia, determines its policy on Indonesian migrant 
labor unilaterally, and is therefore not bound in any way to respect or enforce the conditIOns 
of the Indonesian labor migration system. 
The more complex and arbitrary the system, the more porous these different migration 
categories become. They are also sensitive to changes in the political and economic climate. 
At times, governments actively work to increase the numbers of foreign workers and may 
even ignore the presence of "illegals." But at times of economic downturn or great political 
cost, they move to limit numbers of temporary labor migrants by closer regulation of entry 
and increasingly punitive sanctions against those found without appropriate documents. After 
the Malaysian government enacted a new immigration law on August 1, 2002, almost 
400,000 Indonesians working without appropriate documentation were deported to Belawan, 
Batam and Dumai in Sumatra, and Pontianak and Nunukan in Kalimantan - a policy decision 
that resulted in a humanitarian crisis in Nunukan (Ford 2006a) and severe pressure on local 
authorities in other targeted ports. Since that time, there have been regular deportations: 
almost 17,000 deportees passed through the Tanjung Pinang holding center on the island of 
Bintan in 2006 alone (Ford and Lyons in press-a). 
Migration status and the administrative systems designed to regulate it potentially contribute 
to labor exploitation. Workers can be deported if their documents are found to be fraudulent 
or if officials become aware that their details are falsified. With the increasing use of 
biometrics by immigration authorities, workers with multiple passports and/or names, or who 
knowingly (or unknowingly) change their personal details, can find themselves detained and 
deported if this information is uncovered. Underage workers may face additional problems 
depending on whether the host country has in place antitrafficking laws and regulations. 
These risks make migrant workers less inclined to stand up to an abusive employer. By the 
same token, migration through recognized source-country channels does not guarantee 
ongoing regular status or the protections that designation may appear to imply. Regular 
migrants can choose to enter into irregular status by breaching their visa conditions. They 
may also lose their regular status involuntarily because of changes within the regulatory 
framework or because regulations are framed in such a way as to give employers the power to 
jeopardize migrant workers' legal status for example, by failing to pay a levy, by confiscating 
travel documents, or by forcing workers to do work that breaches their visa conditions – 
conditions which are set and can be changed at any time by the host state (Ford 2010). 
The fact that irregular labor migrants do not necessarily experience more - or even as much - 
exploitation as regular labor migrants either while traveling to the host country or while 
working there suggests that the focus on the means of migration rests on flawed assumptions. 
Nevertheless, host (and source) countries continue to cling to the legal fiction of a 
straightforward distinction between documented/ regular and undocumented/irregular labor 
migration because it serves an important function in border control. Paradoxically, this 
preoccupation with illegal immigration and transnational crime has facilitated the 
implementation of the UN Trafficking Protocol and global countertrafficking measures 
(Kapur 2005; Turnbull 1999). The result is an elision between antitrafficking and 
immigration control which renders border control and anti-immigration activities more 
palatable to the public on the grounds that they contribute to the process of helping "innocent 
victims" of trafficking (Berman 2010: 89). While much of this focus has been on trafficking 
for sexual exploitation, the crime of "labor trafficking" is gaining increasing attention. 
Using the antitrafficking framework to deal with labor migration 
The extent to which the abuse of labor migrants has been framed as human trafficking varies 
dramatically between national contexts, depending on whether or not a particular country has 
an antitrafficking law and, if so, whether it focuses primarily on human trafficking for the 
purposes of sexual exploitation.7 While continuing to emphasize human trafficking for the 
purposes of sexual exploitation, Indonesian government policy has increasingly focused on 
labor migration since the Trafficking Protocol came into existence. Specific reference is 
made to the potential for trafficking within the formal labor export system in official 
government publications. According to The Elimination of Trafficking in Persons in 
Indonesia, 2004-2005, a publication by the Coordinating Ministry for People's Welfare (the 
body tasked with coordinating the countertrafficking programs of different ministries): 
"Labor recruitment companies, with their network of agents/brokers in many areas, are 
traffickers when they facilitate the falsification of ID cards and passports and illegally 
confine potential migrant workers at the safe house, and put them in a different job than the 
one promised or introduce them by force to the sex industry" (Republic of Indonesia 2005: 
6). According to this view, trafficking occurs when there is deception at the point of 
recruitment (where deception may be interpreted as providing incorrect or false information 
about wages, working hours and type of work) and exploitation in the workplace 
(nonpayment of wages, long working hours, physical or sexual abuse and so on) regardless of 
immigration status. This interpretation entered Indonesian official discourse as a result of 
international interventions, primarily through the efforts of the International Catholic 
Migration Commission and the American Center for International Labor Solidarity, which 
jointly implemented a series of three major antitrafficking projects on behalf of the United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID) (Ford and Lyons in press-a). 
Referring to the conditions of work of documented labor migrants from Indonesia, a major 
report released by these organizations states: 
If recruitment is made through misrepresentation about earnings, and conditions of 
work; If there exists no clear definition of work, working hours, weekly holidays 
and leave; If there are unexplained pay deductions, or withholding payment of 
wages, confinement through confiscation of travel documents or otherwise, and/or 
sexual abuse . . . then a domestic worker employed abroad can be categorized as a 
trafficked person. (Sugiarti et al 2006: 29, emphasis added) 
However, for the most part, the Indonesian government has equated labor trafficking with 
labor migration that takes place outside the formal labor export system. 
At the local level, the concept of labor trafficking has rapidly gained traction, particularly in 
transit zones like the Riau Islands. Initially, countertrafficking brought a rush of brothel raids 
and other measures targeted at trafficking in the local sex industry. In later years, however, 
the focus shifted toward labor migrants, partly as a result of pressure from - and the provision 
of targeted resources by - central agencies and international donors, and partly because local 
governments are reluctant to provide funds from their own budget to resource programs to 
assist deported labor migrants from other provinces to return home. Among nationally 
sponsored initiatives were the passing of Local Regulation No. 12/2007 on the Elimination of 
Trafficking in Women and Children, followed by the drafting of a Local Action Plan, the 
formation of a provincial coordinating taskforce and the establishment of a government-run 
shelter. The provincial government also initiated attempts to coordinate with provinces of 
origin in Java and West Nusa Tenggara (Biro Perempuan Provinsi Kepri 2009).8 Local police 
established trafficking desks and use both the trafficking and labor recruitment laws to punish 
syndicates that deal in labor. Most of those identified as victims of trafficking in the Riau 
Islands are female labor migrants who have entered Malaysia without documents and have 
been subsequently apprehended and deported to Tanjung Pinang. 
In the absence of donor support for programs that deal specifically with migrant workers, 
NGOs have little choice other than to try to deal with deportees through their 
countertrafficking programs. Over the last decade we have witnessed a fundamental shift in 
the ways in which NGO workers position both sex workers and labor migrants in the 
antitrafficking discourse. While most NGOs continue to regard trafficking as a minor 
problem in the commercial sex industry - for them, the main issue is the protection of sex 
worker rights - they are much more willing to use an antitrafficking framework to address 
issues faced by labor migrants. This is evident in the language used to discuss labor 
exploitation, which mirrors the three key elements of the UN Protocol: NGOs claim that 
deportees are subject to a "means" (cara) and "process" (proses) in this case recruitment and 
training which means that they were victims of trafficking. From the perspective of the NGOs 
involved, there are multiple advantages associated with using the antitrafficking discourse to 
deal with labor migrants who have been deported from nearby countries to the Riau Islands. 
One NGO worker explained that while government officials can be convinced to buy a plane 
ticket for a victim of trafficking, they would never fund the individual repatriation of a failed 
migrant worker, no matter how worthy the case. Selective and deliberate use of 
countertrafficking language can also be useful when dealing with some donors who are less 
committed to assisting labor migrants. 
While the short-term benefits of dealing with "failed" labor migration as labor trafficking 
include increased donor funding and attention (the benefits of which cannot be 
underestimated for small NGOs), as well as repatriation assistance for "victims" of labor 
trafficking who wish to return home, there are also numerous disadvantages. Antitrafficking 
laws and regulations not only establish a victim's status but also determine the ways in which 
a victim will be treated. These programs have an overriding interest in returning them to their 
place of origin. In many cases, however, migrant workers do not want to return, especially if 
that involves dealing with the stigma attached to an acknowledgment of victimhood. The 
reality is that large numbers of failed labor migrants want to cross the border again to try their 
luck. With their focus on repatriating trafficking victims, countertrafficking programs not 
only overlook what it is that migrants themselves want out of the migration process, but how 
and why they become undocumented or irregular. 
Conclusion 
The nexus between human trafficking, people smuggling and labor migration is made 
manifest at international borders. Multiple regimes of exclusion and inclusion shaped by 
gender, age, ethnicity and nationality determine the politics of labor market hierarchies, 
which in turn shape the legal, economic and physical vulnerabilities of migrant workers. 
However, the power relations that underpin these migration flows and border controls are 
also revealed in the discursive and material practices associated with labeling different 
migrant populations as "documented workers," "illegals," or "victims of trafficking." It is 
here that the state distinction between "legals" and "illegals" becomes visible and apparent. 
And yet, the framing of all forms of exploitation involving temporary labor migrants as 
"trafficking" ignores the agency of these migrant workers and fails to acknowledge that many 
of them knowingly cross borders without papers and/or choose to undertake jobs deemed 
illegal by both sending and host societies. It also overlooks the endemic character of "gray 
migration" in Indonesia's labor export program, through which prospective labor migrants 
utilize the services of a range of middlemen to procure overseas employment. Indeed, as the 
prevalence of gray migration suggests, immigration status is only part of the problem - when 
it is a problem at all. 
For many migrant workers passing through the Riau Islands to Malaysia, participation in the 
formal labor migration system is neither easy nor desirable, and has little impact on their 
experience abroad. And, except in exceptional circumstances, aspal and regular labor 
migrants experience the same kinds of problems in terms of labor exploitation, especially in 
domestic work or more marginal parts of the service sector, but also in mainstream formal 
sector workplaces where their contracts specify different working conditions from their local 
counterparts. The use of the trafficking discourse to deal with these issues highlights the 
problem of labor exploitation by emphasizing the victimhood of abused migrant workers. But 
at the same time it obscures ways of dealing with it by shifting the focus from host countries' 
failure to regulate more effectively the conditions of work experienced by migrants to the 
criminal actions of nonstate actors engaged in people smuggling and other forms of border-
crossing. The increasing criminalization of labor migrants, and the associated use of a 
criminal justice/border security framework to respond to cross-border flows, has the effect of 
absolving host countries from having to address endemic structural exploitation of migrant 
workers. It also limits the ability of sending countries to protect their nationals by requiring 
them to deal with cases of "irregular" migration by using antitrafficking and/or other 
immigration laws. 
The experiences of temporary labor migrants also draw our attention to the need to 
understand better the interactions between borderlanders and transient populations. Studies of 
borderlands are replete with accounts of the unique character of border life and the imposition 
of state border processes on long-standing border communities. The lives of transient 
"others" - migrants, smuggled persons, "illegals" - rarely feature in these accounts. In 
contrast, studies of migration and human trafficking are preoccupied with places of 
destination and arrival and rarely consider spaces of transit. And yet, the bordering practices 
that shape border life are intrinsically linked to the security and immigration regimes that 
seek to manage a range of cross-border flows. This securitization of the border has 
transformed the physical landscape of many borderland communities, with the construction 
of detention facilities, repatriation desks and victim shelters. It has also irrevocably altered 
the ways that some borderlanders understand the nature of cross-border mobility, as the 
language of trafficking has entered everyday discourse and border-crossing practices 
themselves are subjected to increasing state scrutiny. 
This global obsession with border control has recast the border as "a site of crime" 
(Andrijasevic 2003: 256) policed by a multiplicity of means, some material and others 
juridical. These practices not only "harden" the borders concerned; they also substantially 
change the nature of borderlands. Most Important, these practices are not only played out 
"along the border." The border is policed by immigration officials as well as a range of state 
and nonstate agents, including employers, who may never visit the border regions. Borders 
thus have the capacity to shape the lives of temporary labor migrants (and other migrant 
populations) long after they arrive at their destinations, or indeed, after they return home. It is 
this ability of the border to reach into the heart of the nation-state that necessitates a 
reorientation of our gaze beyond the borderland to the political economy of labor regimes that 
operate within the metropole in order to understand the full extent of bordering practices in 
the twenty-first century. 
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Notes 
1 The UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children 
(hereafter the Trafficking Protocol) defines human trafficking as "the recruitment, transportation, transfer, 
harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, 
of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of 
payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of 
exploitation" (United Nations 2000: 42). 
2 The UN Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air (hereafter Migrant Smuggling 
Protocol) defines migrant smuggling as: "the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial 
                                                                
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national 
or a permanent resident" (United Nations 2000: 54-55). 
3 While these initiatives may improve working conditions, they are inadequate for dealing with the particular 
conditions facing commercial sex workers and informal sector workers, and for addressing the role played by 
organized crime (Bruch 2004: 27). 
4 The research on which this chapter is based was conducted primarily as part of a project, From Migrant to 
Worker, funded by Australian Research Council Discovery Project Grant DP0880081. We would like to thank 
Wayne Palmer for his assistance with follow-up interviews in the Riau Islands in 2010. 
5 This is also the case along the land border between Indonesian Kalimantan and the eastern Malaysian states of 
Sabah and Sarawak (cf. Idrus 2008). 
6 The practice of local Riau Islanders crossing the border for work, leisure or kinship obligations without 
passing through immigration checkpoints is nowadays much less prevalent along this border than it was in the 
past. In other border sites, notably in Kalimantan, however, borderlanders regularly cross the land border to 
work (Illegally) in Malaysia (Eilenberg in press). 
7 See Ford et al. (m press) for in-depth case studies of labor migration and antitrafficking efforts in Southeast 
Asia. 
8 Major obstacles identified by the Women's Bureau in the handling of trafficking cases in the Riau Islands 
included the problem of dealing with deported labor migrants who had not been trafficked and the limitations on 
funding for the handling and provision of services for victims who originate from outside the province. In 
addition, a lack of adequate funding for the shelter meant that it could accommodate victims of trafficking for a 
maximum of just 15 days, and staff have difficulty ensuring that victims are not retrafficked (BIro Perempuan 
Provinsi Kepri 2009). 
